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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Mark Stephen Wicklund appeals from the district court's order denying his
motion to terminate probation and set aside his fine, contending the district court
erred in declining to set aside the remainder of his fine.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
A grand jury indicted Wicklund for sexual battery of a minor child sixteen
or seventeen years of age after he offered a sixteen-year-old boy in the restroom
at Fred Meyer $100.00 to engage in sexual activity.
Detective Hunter, p.1 (attached to PSI).)

(R., pp.10-11; Report of

Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Wicklund pied guilty and the parties ''stipulated" to a seven-year sentence with
two years fixed. (R., p.36.) The parties further agreed that probation would be
appropriate if Wicklund's SANE evaluation indicated he was "amenable to
community based treatment."

(R., p.37.)

The Rule 11 Plea Agreement also

included the following language: "Fine: Not applicable." (R., p.37.)
On November 15, 2001, the court entered judgment imposing a unified
seven-year sentence with two years fixed. (R., pp.45-50.) The court, however,
suspended the sentence and placed Wicklund on probation. (R., pp.45-50.) The
special conditions of Wicklund's probation included the following: "The defendant
shall pay a $20,000 fine at the minimum rate of $250 per month." (R., p.47 ,re.)
Wicklund accepted this term and all other terms of his probation. (R., p. 47 ,re
(term initialed); p.49 (certification signed by Wicklund that states: "I have read or
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had read to me and fully understand and accept all the conditions, regulations
and restrictions under which I am being granted probation.").)
Approximately six years later, on January 23, 2008, the state filed a
Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation contending Wicklund violated
the terms of his probation. (R., pp.89-91, 98-100.) The court found Wicklund in
violation of his probation based on one of the allegations in the state's motion;
specifically, that Wicklund failed to "abide by the lawful request of his supervising
officer that he have no internet access while on probation unless work related."
(R., pp.99, 118.)

The court, however, reinstated and extended Wicklund's

probation through November 13, 2011, with additional special conditions
including that Wicklund's "access to the internet shall be suspended for an
indefinite period or until [hisJ probation officer can be convinced that it is
necessary for [Wicklund'sJ business and livelihood and that [Wicklund] can be
trusted to use the internet only for work purposes." (R., pp.118-119 (emphasis
original).)
On June 10, 2009, Wicklund filed a Motion for Early Release From
Probation, which the court denied. (R., pp.121-122.) Wicklund filed a motion to
reconsider, which was also denied. (R., pp.127-133.)
On November 23, 2010, Wicklund filed a Motion to Terminate Probation
and Set Aside Fine. (R., pp.134-141.) Wicklund set forth the following "facts" in
support of his motion:
At the time of the original sentencing in 2001, [Wicklund} was
also sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of $20,000. [Wicklund}
began to make payments as his financial situation allowed and he
has paid approximately $5662.00 of the fine.
According to
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[Wicklund's] calculations, approximately $14,626.50 remain [sic] in
unpaid fines .
. . . [Wicklund] is an expert in the area of computers and
worked in that industry during his working career. However, in
2004 [Wicklund) suffered an accident and has since been totally
disabled and receives his sole income in the form of disability
payments. [Wicklund] now lives at home with his elderly parents
who are in failing health and now require constant nursing care .
. . . [T]he Rule 11 agreement contemplates [Wicklund] would
be allowed to use the internet, pending the approval of his
probation officer. However, the probation office has not permitted
[Wicklund) use of the internet for the past five years. In fact, it was
these restrictions that resulted in the probation violation which was
filed in 2008.
Thus, [Wicklund) has been unable to work in any capacity
due to his total disability as well as the restrictions placed upon him
preventing him from using the internet even for work purposes.
Further, [Wicklund's) very limited financial resources have been
acknowledged by the probation department. They have waived the
costs of monthly supervision based on [Wicklund's] financial
condition for years.
(R., pp.135-136.)
With respect to Wicklund's request to have his fine "set aside," Wicklund
argued:

"an examination of the stipulated sentence signed by both parties

reveals that a fine was not contemplated by the parties and that no fine should
have been assessed." (R., p.137.) Wicklund also referenced the "not applicable"
language included in the plea agreement in relation to the word "[f]ine."

(R.,

p.137.) Based on this language, Wicklund claimed the fine was "illegal." (R.,
pp.138-139.) Wicklund also cited his "changed" "financial situation" in support of
his request to set aside the fine and asserted this change rendered the condition
that he pay a fine "impossible." (R., pp.138-140.)
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The district court denied Wicklund's motion to terminate probation and set
aside his fine stating, in relevant part, that the court never agreed, as part of
Wicklund's plea agreement, to not impose a fine. (R., p.141.) The court further
stated: "At the time of sentencing, [Wicklund] was aware that this Court would
impose a fine and [he] chose not to withdraw his plea, but to go forward with it
since it required probation." (R., p.141 (emphasis original).)
Wicklund timely appealed from the district court's order denying his
request to terminate probation and set aside his fine. (R., pp.142-144.)

4

ISSUE
Wicklund states the issue on appeal as:
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it ordered Mr.
Wicklund to pay a fine which was impossible for him to pay?
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Wicklund failed to establish the district court erred in declining his
request to set aside the remainder of his fine based on Wicklund's claim of
impossibility?

5

ARGUMENT
Wicklund Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Request
To Set Aside The Remainder Of His Fine
A.

Introduction
Wicklund claims the district court erred in denying his motion to set aside

the remainder of his fine because, he argues, the fine is impossible for him to
pay. 1 Wicklund's claim fails. Application of the correct legal standards to the
evidence presented to the district court demonstrates the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining Wicklund's request to set aside the remainder of
his fine based on Wicklund's alleged difficulties in paying his monthly fine
obligation.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether the terms and conditions of a defendant's probation are

reasonably related to the goals of probation is a legal question over which we
exercise free review." State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229
(Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179
(Ct. App. 1993)).

Whether the condition imposed is impossible to fulfill is,

however, reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cross, 105 Idaho 494,
496, 670 P.2d 901, 903 (1983).

1

Although Wicklund claims on appeal that the fine "condition of [his] probation is
impossible ... and is illegal under Idaho law," based on Wicklund's statement of
the issue and the argument contained in his brief, it does not appear he is
claiming, as he did below, that imposition of the fine was illegal because it was
contrary to the Rule 11 Plea Agreement as he has failed to present any argument
or authority in support of such a claim. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.3-4.)
6

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining To Set Aside
The Remainder Of Wicklund's Fine
Wicklund claims the district erred in denying his request to set aside his

fine for two reasons. First, Wicklund asserts "it is impossible for him to pay the
remainder of the fine levied against him" due to his "disability status."
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

Second, Wicklund argues "his inability to use the

internet, even for business purposes, removes the remote possibility for him to
be able to find some type of employment that would give him sufficient income to
pay the fine." (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Wicklund relies on State v. Wakefield, 145
Idaho 270, 178 P.3d 635 (Ct. App. 2007), in support of his claim that his alleged
inability to pay required the district court to set aside the remainder of the fine.
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Wicklund is incorrect.
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601, a sentencing court has broad discretion in
fashioning a sentence appropriate to the defendant including imposition of
probationary terms that are reasonably related to the goals of probation. State v.
Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v.
Jones, 123 Idaho 315,318,847 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Ct App. 1993)). "The purpose
of probation is to give the defendant an opportunity to be rehabilitated under
proper control and supervision. Thus, a condition of probation must be
reasonably related to the purpose of probation, which is rehabilitation." State v.
Dicksen, _

P.3d _ , 2011 WL 1938498 *5 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).

The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the payment of a fine is
reasonably related to rehabilitation.

State v. Cross, 105 Idaho 494, 496, 670

P.2d 901, 903 (1983) (citation omitted).
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When the district court initially suspended Wick!und's sentence and placed
him on probation, Wicklund agreed to several probationary terms, including that
he pay "a $20,000 fine at the minimum rate of $250 per month." (R., p.47 ,re.)
Neither Wicklund's subsequent disability nor any prohibition on his ability to use
the internet rendered that condition of his probation impossible.

Although

Wicklund is reportedly disabled, he still receives an income, which he reports as
"approximately $1300.00 a month." (R., p.140.) Although Wicklund claims "[t]his
amount does not cover his necessary living expenses," he offered no evidence to
support that assertion nor did he provide any information to the court regarding
what his living expenses are.

Notably, Wicklund's financial condition has not

prohibited him from hiring a lawyer in an effort to terminate his probation and
avoid paying the entirety of his fine. In short, that Wicklund's income may have
decreased since his original agreement to pay a fine does not mean payment of
that fine is now impossible.
As for Wicklund's claim that "his inability to access the internet only
exacerbates the problem," any such inhibition on his ability to generate income is
of his own making.

(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

At the outset of his probation,

Wicklund was "permitted to utilize the Internet for his computer consultation
business." (R., p.37.) That use only became subject to an additional condition
when Wicklund decided to use the internet for purposes other than work 2 at

22

Specifically, Wicklund's probation officer testified that Wicklund was on
MySpace contacting young males (Tr., p.53, L.3 - p.54, L.10, p.59, L.12 - p.63,
L.22; exhibits 1, 2) and a scan of his computer revealed pornography (Tr., p.65,
L.2 - p.70, L.5, p.75, L.10). The probation officer also discovered Wicklund
installed a program called "Evidence Eliminator" onto his computer hard drive.
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which time the court "suspended" Wicklund's "access to the internet for an
indefinite period or until [Wicklund'sJ probation officer can be convinced that it is
necessary for [Wicklund'sJ business and livelihood and that [Wicklund] can be
trusted to use the internet only for work purposes."

(R., pp.98-99, 118-119

(emphasis original).) That Wicklund has been unable or unwilling to demonstrate
his computer use was limited to work does not make his obligation to pay his fine
impossible.

It only means that he, by his own choices, has made it more

financially burdensome to do so.
Notwithstanding Wicklund's assertion to the contrary, the Court's opinion
in Wakefield does not compel a contrary conclusion. In Wakefield, the defendant
was placed on probation and, as a condition of probation, he was required to pay
restitution. 145 Idaho at 271, 178 P.3d at 636. The district court did not impose
a particular payment schedule but instead left the "rate of payment ... to be
determined within the discretion of Wakefield's probation officer."

kl

The state

subsequently filed a motion to revoke Wakefield's probation based, in part, on
the fact that he missed a "monthly payment."

kl

Wakefield responded that he

was not in arrears because he had made some payments in advance and was
actually "one payment ahead of schedule."

kl

Although the district court denied

the state's request to revoke Wakefield's probation, it granted the state's request
to increase Wakefield's monthly payments.

kl

(Tr., p.75, Ls.19-22.) "Evidence Eliminator" is used to "disguise, hide, remove
files from a computer, remove any trace of that from the computer, so that it's
difficult for other forensic software to detect[.}" (Tr., p. 75, L.23 - p. 76, L.2.)
9

On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded the district court abused its
discretion "by acting arbitrarily, without evidence before it to support the decision
made." Wakefield, 145 Idaho at 273, 178 P.3d at 638. The Court explained:
[TJhe district court needed to examine Wakefield's
financial resources, needs, and earning ability before
his monthly payment amounts would take effect.
schedule that sets arbitrary, prospective increases
evaluating a probationer's current resources, needs,
ability at the time those increases are to take effect is
discretion.

then-current
increases in
A payment
without reand earning
an abuse of

Id.
Unlike Wakefield, the court in this case did not increase Wicklund's agreed
upon monthly fine payment, it only declined Wicklund's request to excuse him
from that obligation. Nothing in Wicklund supports the proposition that declining
such a request constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Indeed, Idaho case law is

clear that imposition of a fine is an appropriate component of sentencing,
particularly when a defendant agrees to the terms of a fine as a condition of
probation. Cross is instructive on this point.
In Cross, the court ordered the defendants to pay $25,000.00 in $2,500.00
installments payable every six months. 105 Idaho at 495, 670 P.2d at 902. The
defendants appealed claiming this condition of probation was not reasonably
related to rehabilitation and was "beyond their financial means."
Supreme Court rejected both arguments.

The Idaho

With respect to whether a fine is

reasonably related to the rehabilitative goal of probation, the Court concluded
"requiring [the defendants] to pay $25,000.00 would impress upon them the
seriousness of their actions as well as possibly deter them from conducting future
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illegal activity in Idaho."

kl at 496,

670 P.2d at 903. Regarding the claim that

the fine payments created an impossible condition of probation, the Court noted
the defendants agreed to pay the fine and acknowledged the ability to do so at
the time of sentencing and that they had, in fact, made payments totaling
$10,000.00

kl

The Court further stated:

"Alleging difficulty in meeting the

payments, as opposed to impossibility, is not sufficient to find an abuse of
discretion."

kl

As in Cross, Wicklund agreed to the terms of his probation including the
requirement that he pay a significant fine and he acknowledges, and the record
reflects, that payments were made toward that obligation. (R., pp.5-6, 135.) As
found by the district court, "[t]he fine was and remains appropriate to meet the
legitimate sentencing goals including rehabilitation, deterrence, and punishment."
(R., p.141.)

That Wicklund now claims he is having "difficulty in meeting the

payments" does not establish "impossibility" and "is not sufficient to find an abuse
of discretion." Cross, 105 Idaho at 495, 670 P.2d at 903. Wicklund has failed to
establish otherwise.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Wicklund's motion to terminate his probation and set aside his fine.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2011.

,J SSICA M. LORELLO
D puty Attorney General
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Law Office of Jacob D. Deaton
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